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Title: Sexual Rights: A New Politics of Recognition      [© Greg A. Mullins]

It is a great pleasure and honor for me to be here today, and I wish to thank my gracious hosts at CLAM for extending this kind invitation to share ideas. I am reading today from my current research, a book entitled “Human Rights, Humane Letters,” in which I argue that humanities scholarship can and should come to the assistance of social science scholarship in clarifying how and why rights frameworks can be best captured by progressive activists. I focus especially on rights associated with gender and sexuality. A portion of my project is to defend human rights from conservative appropriations of its rhetoric, for example, from efforts by my own government to claim its war of aggression against Iraq is a defense of democracy and hence of human rights. In addition, I defend sexual rights against a critique arising from the left that links them with cultural imperialism.

In the following remarks, I will be focusing first on the question of cultural imperialism, and then on the question of neoliberalism. In fact, contemporary imperialism and neoliberalism are strongly interrelated, and they raise two persistent challenges for those of us working in the area of sexual rights: 1) can advocacy for sexual rights be aligned with anti-imperialist activism, or does it unwittingly participate in forms of cultural imperialism, and 2) can sexual rights be pursued outside frameworks of neoliberal politics?

Allow me to take up the first question with a substantive response to a cultural critic who does link sexual rights to cultural imperialism. The context of the analysis is the situation in Egypt following the May 2001 police raid on a Cairo discotheque, the Queen Boat, and on a critique of human rights advocacy following that raid. The critique appeared in the journal *Public Culture* in 2002, authored by Joseph Massad, a professor at Columbia University in New York.<sup>1</sup>

Massad offers an extensive critique of human rights work that imposes sexual identity categories in the Arab and Muslim worlds.<sup>2</sup> Massad views human rights work on behalf of sexual and gender minorities as harmfully imposing sexual identity categories, such as “lesbian” and “gay,” on diverse societies that neither need nor welcome such an imposition. His objection is related to the wider charge that human rights discourse originates in the “West” and enforces cultural imperialism on “the rest” of the world, insofar as universal definitions of human rights insist that all societies respect the primacy of the individual subject. Massad frames his analysis through the work of Michel Foucault and ascribes to discourse the capacity to enforce a binary division of people into either homosexual or heterosexual sexual identities.<sup>3</sup> What Foucault described as happening in Europe in the late nineteenth century, Massad argues is happening today in select urban centers of the Arab and Muslim worlds. Massad examines journalism, human rights activism, and Orientalist scholarship on male sexuality and concludes that these forms of discourse combine to export and reproduce “Western” epistemologies and ontologies of sexual identity in the Arab and Muslim worlds, and especially among middle class urban men who have sex with men.<sup>4</sup>

The broad framework of this analysis is shared by other critics, who inflect it in diverse arguments (I'm thinking of Neville Hoad writing on South Africa, Sean Patrick Larvie on Brazil, and Rosalind Morris on Thailand).<sup>5</sup> But Massad's argument shifts from discourse analysis as such into invective against putatively conspiratorial gay and lesbian persons. He characterizes scholars, journalists, and advocates of sexual and gender rights as crusaders whose "missionary tasks, the discourse that produces them, and the organizations that represent them... constitute what I call the *Gay International*" (362).<sup>6</sup> In Massad's account, this group attempts to "liberate Arab and Muslim 'gays and lesbians' from the oppression under which they allegedly live by transforming them from practitioners of same-sex contact into subjects who identify as homosexual and gay" (362). This effort has already, in his view, produced a small group of urban, middle-class, gay identified Arab men, who subsequently have been targeted for discrimination and persecution by Islamists and the police and judiciary of conservative states, most spectacularly in Cairo.<sup>7</sup> Rather than liberate Arab and Muslim sexual and gender minorities, the efforts of human rights activists have endangered people who, previous to the exercise of a discourse of homosexuality, would have fulfilled their sexual desires without much notice or social sanction. Moreover, Massad warns that the repression that has begun in Cairo will not harm "the Gay International or its upper-class supporters in the Arab diaspora," but over the long term is likely to lead to harassment and persecution of the "poor and nonurban men who practice same-sex contact and who do not identify as homosexual or gay" (384).

The turn toward invective against conspiratorial "Western" agents distracts Massad from a discourse analysis of rights and sexuality that, I would argue, does have

merits. Foucault usefully reminds us that rights discourse has historically produced citizen subjects subordinate to repressive states, but at the same time, Foucault leveraged rights language in a critique of the state.<sup>8</sup> Massad blames the so-called Gay International for inciting a discourse of sexual identity, but a Foucaultian analysis could as well critique the Egyptian government for this incitement. The larger point is that a substantial discourse analysis would not be limited to partisan accusations of cause and effect. What is needed is a more profound understanding of how to leverage rights talk, and how to engage cultural politics, for progressive political ends.

In his discussion of the police raid on the Queen Boat disco, Massad states “The arrested men—all Egyptian—were reportedly roughed up and insulted by the police” (380). Massad’s skeptical and dismissive characterization belies ample evidence available in 2001 and 2002 that those arrested were subjected to systematic torture at the hands of the state. Research and testimonials published subsequently indicate that the raid on the discotheque was only one part of a coordinated effort to entrap and arrest men who seek sex with other men. At least 179 men have been named by the state for prosecution under laws criminalizing “debauchery,” many more might be detained secretly, and those who have emerged from prison bear the physical and psychological scars of savage beatings, electroshock, burns, and other forms of torture.<sup>9</sup>

An analysis of the institutions that shape political decision-making and of the specific forms of state repression in Egypt offers a more satisfactory explanation for the campaign against so-called sexual “debauchery” than does Massad’s polemic. Hossam Bahgat argues that the arrests arose from a larger effort to “divert public attention from economic recession and the government’s liquidity crisis” and to “deflate an Islamist

opposition movement” by claiming guardianship over the nation’s morality.<sup>10</sup> Scott Long offers a more specific analysis based on interviews with people with personal knowledge of the lead defendant in the Queen Boat case. In Long’s account, that defendant belongs to a powerful political family, and “in the months before his arrest, family members had cast aspersions on the sexuality of a presidential relative. In revenge, State Security built a case attacking him not only as a homosexual but as a blasphemer... to humiliate him and warn off anyone responsible for such rumors.”<sup>11</sup>

Massad’s argument describes a blunt binary opposition between the “West” and the Arab and Muslim worlds, and given its many other signs of subtle intelligence, his essay deploys an astonishingly narrow and brittle concept of culture. Rather than understanding culture (and sexuality and gender within culture) as dynamic, contested, and plural, and rather than exploring the ways in which Arabs and Muslims creatively appropriate, refashion, and redeploy borrowed concepts and practices of sexuality and gender within locally coherent systems of meaning, Massad decries any expression of gay Arab identity as a capitulation to a hegemonic “Western” epistemology and ontology of sexuality. He does not consider the possibility that the emerging scholarship, literature, interviews, and political activism by and about Arab and Muslim gender and sexual minorities does not necessarily replicate epistemologies and ontologies familiar to “Western” metropolitan centers, but rather could be in the process of describing and creating new systems of knowing and being appropriate for Arab and Muslim cultural and political contexts.

I have critiqued Massad’s essay at length not because it is simplistic or naïve but precisely because it very intelligently presents a line of argumentation that advocates of

sexual and gender rights must be able to answer effectively. Massad's emphasis on discourse analysis is useful insofar as it reminds us that language does have specific political effects. Whether through translations of foreign words into Arabic or through the multilingual use and redeployment of words such as "lesbian," "gay" or "transgender," language can shift consciousness and create new articulations of subjectivity. But these changes may or may not be liberatory. No formula can easily predict when the changes in language, culture, and consciousness speeded by contemporary processes of diaspora, globalization, and imperialism will result in conservative or progressive, in colonizing or anti-colonial political effects.

Furthermore, international human rights activists must remain consistently alert to the possibility that the efforts they make on behalf of people in geographically distant parts of the globe may have unintended consequences. For this reason, responsible international activists mobilize their resources in response to requests from local activists who better understand the tactics and strategies needed in a particular political situation. Close collaboration goes a long way toward preventing the scenario Massad describes of self-interested activists imposing their epistemologies and ontologies from "the West" on "the rest" of the world. But it doesn't by itself answer his larger charge: that activism for sexual and gender rights imposes sexual identity categories on societies that neither need nor benefit from them. Indeed, I would agree with Massad that the discourse of sexual and gender rights has contributed to the growing articulation of lesbian and gay identities among Arabs and Muslims, although I would hasten to add that if we really want to understand this phenomenon, a discourse analysis should amplify rather than displace a social and economic analysis of labor, capital, family structure, communications

technologies, diaspora, and the impact of all these on formations of gender and sexuality cross-culturally within contemporary processes of globalization.

I especially hesitate to accept Massad's claim that Arab and Muslim men who have sex with men would be better served by silence than by rights talk. When it comes to establishing the "need" and the "benefit" of sexual and gender rights and the social identities this rights talk may help create, we must analyze the political struggle to define "need" and "benefit." Whose "need"? Whose "benefit"? In the case of Egypt, do the men who have suffered from entrapment, arrest, torture, show trials, and convictions to hard labor benefit from human rights interventions? Would low-profile pressure help them more than an international media campaign? Will women, especially those who have sex with other women, benefit or not?

The provisional answers to these and related questions will guide the decisions made by people targeted for persecution, by Egyptian activists, and by the human rights workers they collaborate with internationally. Well-grounded scholarship can foster better decision making, and cultural criticism can play a productive role. The chief merit of Joseph Massad's essay is its consideration of the mechanisms through which sexual and gender rights can be absorbed by a project of cultural imperialism. The deficiency of his essay arises primarily from Massad's refusal to offer two kinds of recognition. Firstly, he refuses to recognize culture as plural, dynamic, and contested, preferring instead to establish the cultural "authenticity" of his own analysis in rigid distinction against that offered by self-identified gay Arab or Muslim men. Secondly, he refuses to recognize the victims of Egypt's state-sponsored moral panic, dismissing the severity of their persecution as merely "reportedly roughed up and insulted" by Egyptian police.<sup>12</sup>

Once recognition is extended in these areas, the Foucaultian discourse analysis underwriting Massad's argument is opened to an entirely different conclusion. Respected as political agents rather than disregarded as Westernized dupes, the victims of moral panic in Egypt emerge as subjects capable of self-representation, with voices that demand to be heard. From a theoretical as well as a strategic political perspective, we can and must strengthen our analysis of rights and sexuality as discursive formations. Doing so will allow us to more profoundly understand how political subjectivity is constituted, and how it can be leveraged for progressive political ends. Moreover, the testimony of those who suffer from repression such as we've seen in Cairo will clarify who suffers and benefits from moral panics, and ultimately will clarify how the political logics that generate them can be short-circuited.

As I turn now to the related question of neoliberalism and sexual rights, I wish to underscore the usefulness of keeping our focus on recognition as a key word of analysis and political advocacy. I am speaking here not only of recognition in its classic political meaning, that is, the citizen who is recognized by the state, but also recognition in an erotic and a poetic sense. And I'll argue that the erotic and the poetic do have political consequence.

Willingly or not, we inhabit a neoliberal age. Since the end of World War II, coordinated international political forces have enforced an international economic agenda of reduced state spending, privatization of formerly state-owned enterprises as well as of health care and education, the erosion of labor union influence and of social welfare safety nets, and a redistribution of wealth upward in two senses: to the global north, and to wealthy elites. Neoliberalism is supported by an ideological structure that not only



defends its economic practices in terms of efficiency and the creation of wealth but that also prefers corporate power to state power, prefers consumer identity to citizenship, and discredits social group identity in favor of atomized, individual economic actors. The critique of neoliberalism is almost invariably yoked to a critique of U.S. imperialism, for the United States has been the driving force behind the World Bank and IMF economic restructuring programs, and the cumulative effect of international financial and economic restructuring policies since World War II has been to concentrate increased wealth in the hands of corporations and elites disproportionately located in the United States and, secondarily, the other advanced industrial nations.<sup>13</sup>

The exercise of Western imperial domination in the contemporary world is implemented in part through neoliberal economic programs, and these programs incorporate a selective rhetoric of human rights. For example, political actors who promote neoliberalism also promote a select sub-set of human rights (such as the right to vote, or freedom of speech). An alternative rhetoric of human rights can be mobilized to critique imperialism and neoliberalism, and that alternative has been widely embraced, for example at the World Social Forum. The rights to health care, education, employment, to free association in labor movements, to a clean environment, and so forth contest and even contradict a neoliberal economic regime. However, when we turn our attention specifically to matters of sexuality and rights, and even more specifically to expressions of same-sex desire, it may not be immediately apparent whether neoliberal or anti-neoliberal efforts best support sexual rights.

The program of human rights most closely associated with neoliberalism can be construed to support sexual rights insofar as it urges respect for the individual person and

non-interference in one's private affairs by an intrusive state. According to this logic, the uses one makes of one's own body, whether for sexual reproduction, sexual pleasure, or sexual commerce, should be respected as a matter of personal autonomy. In addition, we can consider the argument of John D'Emilio that lesbian and gay social identities only emerge when social and economic conditions allow sufficient numbers of people to disengage from heteronormative family structures and obligations.<sup>14</sup> One could argue that activist successes in, for example, passing legislation forbidding discrimination based on sexual orientation, has followed in the wake of increased visibility of lesbian and gay consumers. In the strongest articulation of this view, explicit human rights protections of lesbian and gay persons depends on the emergence of a market-driven economy, which produces sexual citizens via the production of sexual consumers.

I find this argument credible. There is little doubt that politically organized lesbian and gay communities are commonly found in thoroughly capitalist urban consumer societies, and that these communities tend to make political claims as sexual citizens. Sexual citizenship is often organized under the rubric of rights, and includes the demand that the state recognize all citizens and treat them equally without discrimination based on sexual orientation or sexual identity.

But while the link between consumer society, sexual identity, and sexual citizenship is readily described, I hesitate to accept the prescription that this route toward political mobilization is either inevitable or preferable. On the contrary, as a prescription for political organizing it is deeply problematic. In the first place, to argue that sexual rights advocacy can only emerge in consumer societies that have fostered certain types of lesbian and gay identities amounts to an abandonment of advocacy for a much wider

range of non-normative sexualities that are also subject to persecution and discrimination. A few examples would include women who have sex with women but don't identify as lesbian; men who have sex with men but don't identify as gay; bisexuals; and gender variant people who face hostility and harm because of prejudicial views of gender and sexual non-conformity. Secondly, to believe that only via consumer capitalism can sexual minorities find a political voice would require us to disregard evidence of such political struggles waged through diverse registers in socialist societies (for example, in East Germany prior to 1989 or in Cuba today), as well as in societies with a hybrid or uneven economic system. Thirdly, to prescribe neoliberal economic policies as an ally of sexual rights advocacy taints such advocacy with the imperial program of neoliberalism and with its ideological emphasis on the atomized individual/consumer. In other words, if human rights advocacy for sexual minorities is a feature or result of neoliberalism it is opened to a critique of imperialism that is often described as cultural imperialism. Moreover, a neoliberal embrace of sexual rights advocacy alienates that advocacy from those human rights priorities that contradict neoliberal prescriptions, including rights to health care, education, housing, employment and so forth.

In the remaining minutes of this talk, I wish to extend this argument by reflecting on a work of fiction, the novel *In Another Place, Not Here* by the Canadian/Caribbean writer Dionne Brand.<sup>15</sup> This extraordinary novel helps us conceive of a politics of love that is not dependent on sexual identity or consumer society. Dionne Brand encourages us to envision a struggle for social justice that links the struggle against racism, against imperialism, and against economic exploitation with a vision for human flourishing that respects the lives, loves, desires, and health of all women and indeed of all people. In

establishing those linkages, Brand de-links the logic that would associate same-sex desire with sexual identity formed through consumption. Her model of political work does not depend upon citizenship and recognition by a liberal state as a precondition for staking claims of justice.

I do not assume that you have read this novel, and with the little time available I can only describe it briefly. I will just say that the novel explores love between three women: Verlia and Abena, both Canadians of Afro-Caribbean origin, are lovers and leftist activists. Verlia leaves Abena to join the revolution on the island of Grenada. There she meets and falls in love with Elizete, a woman abandoned to a marginal life on a sugar plantation. Verlia dies during the American invasion of Grenada in 1983, and Elizete flees to Canada, to seek friendship and support from Abena. It is a geopolitical novel that aligns desire and love with political struggle against racism, imperialism, and patriarchy, and maps both love and politics onto the physical geography of the Americas.

The novel is centrally concerned with recognition: the Canadian state refuses to recognize Elizete and other undocumented immigrants, who suffer severe human rights abuse without recourse to state protection. Brand links present abuses to a history of colonialism and slavery that refused to recognize the humanity of the enslaved. But Brand's novel also showcases a healing register of recognition: that of empathy, love, and sexual desire. The novel appears in two sections: the first is entitled "Elizete, beckoned," and the second is called "Verlia, flying." A gesture of recognition and an act of movement: between these two arcs of meaning the poetics and the politics of the novel unfold. The novel opens in Elizete's consciousness, with the memory of the moment she first cast her eyes on Verlia. "Grace. Is grace, yes. And I take it, quiet, quiet, like thieving

sugar” (3). Elizete is cutting sugar cane at this moment, and Verlia is transfixed by the beautiful motion of her arm as it swings a machete through the air. Verlia sees in that movement an “avenging grace” (203) that opens the women to each other through mutual desire. As with divine grace, the love Elizete and Veria offer each other carries no expectation that one deserves it or can compensate it. It also expresses the sense of a gorgeous movement, an inspired gesture. The grace that passes between Verlia and Elizete speaks to a specific truth in their lives, and in its glorious excess it remains stubbornly outside economies of exchange, consumption, debt, or constraint. In short, it remains outside neoliberal logics.

Grace, in this novel, provides us with a language for understanding sexual desire between two women as a fundamental element of human flourishing. Brand’s language is not held captive to an exterior or colonizing epistemology of human sexuality. She could have described Elizete and Verlia and Abena as lesbian or bisexual, but the choice not to use those words directs our attention away from preexisting paradigms and toward a more intimate, a more local understanding of the profound relationships these three women share. Just as Elizete and Verlia recognize each other in a moment of beauty and transcendence, so too are readers invited to recognize the truth of their sexuality in this moment of epiphany.

If anyone wishes to read my extended analysis of this novel, I am happy to share it with you. But having introduced Brand’s ideas, I will conclude and invite discussion.

Distancing herself from a neoliberal logic of recognition, Brand turns to narrative art to imagine original logics and self-sufficient frames of reference. *In Another Place, Not Here* de-links human sexuality and the claims of sexual rights from liberalism and

neoliberalism, and celebrates transformative modes of erotic and affective connection among women. Brand offers us a vision of sexual politics fully aligned with a broad vision of social justice, and fully capable of conceptualizing sexual expression as a mode of human flourishing alongside freedom from violence, exploitation, and discrimination, and alongside access to employment, housing, health care, and education. Verlia's story suggests that through a precise understanding of human passion we can perceive the links among the interior landscapes of our emotions, our intersubjective and empathic connections with others, and our desires for justice. In Dionne Brand's words, "Revolutions do not happen outside of you, they happen in the vein, they change you and you change yourself, and you wake up in the morning changing."<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Professor Massad teaches modern Arab politics and intellectual history. Some in the audience might be familiar with the controversy surrounding Massad, as his name has appeared in the media in the context of accusations of pro-Palestinian bias in Middle Eastern Studies at Columbia University. My critique of his *Public Culture* essay is by no means an endorsement of the vilification of his scholarship and teaching on Israel and Palestine. On the contrary, I find his analysis of Israeli and Palestinian history and politics to be well-grounded and persuasive.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph Massad, "Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World" *Public Culture* 14(2): 361-385. It is somewhat perilous to consider so many diverse and heterogeneous societies under the rubric of "Arab and Muslim worlds." It is essential to foreground the fact that not all Arabs are Muslim, and that the Muslim world under discussion focuses on North Africa, the Middle East with some mention of South Asia and Indonesia, and emphasis on Arabic, Turkish, and Persian language sources. My own use of the phrase "Arab and Muslim worlds" emphasizes the intersection of two spheres whose pluralism expands rather than narrows the range of cultural life.

<sup>3</sup> Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality Volume One: An Introduction*, 1973, Trans. Robert Hurley, (New York: Vintage, 1990).

<sup>4</sup> He focuses on men, and not on women or transgender, transsexual, or intersex persons, because the vast majority of the texts he critiques have this focus.

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<sup>5</sup> Neville Hoad, "Between the White Man's Burden and the White Man's Disease: Tracking Lesbian and Gay Human Rights in Southern Africa," 1999 *GLQ* 5.4: 559-584. Sean Patrick Larvie, "Queerness and the Specter of Brazilian National Ruin," 1999 *GLQ* 5.4: 527-558. Rosalind C. Morris, "Educating Desire: Thailand, Transnationalism, and Transgression," *Social Text* 52/53, Vol 15, Nos 3 and 4, Fall/Winter 1997: 53-79.

<sup>6</sup> Over the course of his essay Massad uses the word "crusading" one time and "missionary" five times. He warns against flattening out competing arenas of scholarly, journalistic, and travel discourse, then proceeds to flatten them.

<sup>7</sup> The Queen Boat episode is effectively described by Long and Bahgat (see notes below).

<sup>8</sup> Foucault's critique that rights are a feature of repressive liberal "governmentality" is probably better known among his readers. See "Two Lectures," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon/Random House, 1980), and "Governmentality," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: Univ of Chicago Press, 1991). He warned against liberal and "universal" claims on human rights, noting acidly that "One must guard against reintroducing a hegemonic thought on the pretext of presenting a human rights theory or policy. After all, Leninism was presented as a human rights policy...". Interview with F. Anquetil in Foucault, *Power*, Ed. James D. Faubion (New York: The New Press, 2000): 472.

However, Foucault envisioned forms of rights claims based on political dissidence, and made by private persons and organizations outside state structures of governmentality. In "Two Lectures," cited above, he writes that we should seek "a new form of right, one which must indeed be anti-disciplinary, but at the same time liberated from the principle of sovereignty" (108). See also his statement "Confronting Governments: Human Rights," written in response to the exodus of Vietnamese on fragile boats, and to the failure of governments to protect them from piracy. The statement is virtually a Foucaultian UDHR, and is reprinted in Foucault, *Power*, Ed. James D. Faubion (New York: The New Press, 2000): 474-475.

<sup>9</sup> Scott Long, *In a Time of Torture: The Assault of Justice in Egypt's Crackdown on Homosexual Conduct*, a Human Rights Watch publication available at <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/egypt0304/> and Scott Long, "The Trials of Culture: Sex and Security in Egypt," Middle East Report Online, [http://www.merip.org/mer/mer230/230\\_long.html](http://www.merip.org/mer/mer230/230_long.html) and Hossam Bahgat, "Explaining Egypt's Targeting of Gays" Middle East Report Online, <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero072301.html> .

<sup>10</sup> Hossam Bahgat, "Explaining Egypt's Targeting of Gays" Middle East Report Online, <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero072301.html> Bahgat was dismissed from employment at the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights for publishing this report, which is critical

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of the majority of Egyptian human rights organizations for failing to support the original 52 Queen Boat detainees.

<sup>11</sup> Scott Long, “The Trials of Culture: Sex and Security in Egypt,” Middle East Report Online, [http://www.merip.org/mer/mer230/230\\_long.html](http://www.merip.org/mer/mer230/230_long.html)

<sup>12</sup> The charge that self-identified gay Arab and Muslim men are “native informants” in service of the West appears seven times in his essay.

<sup>13</sup> For a superb overview of neoliberalism, and a critique of how a politics of equality has displaced a politics of social change, see Lisa Duggan, *The Twilight of Equality*, (Boston: Beacon, 2003).

<sup>14</sup> John D’Emilio, “Capitalism and Gay Identity” originally published in *Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality*, Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell, and Sharon Thompson, eds., (The Monthly Review Press, 1983), and reprinted in *The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader*, Henry Abelove, Michèle Aina Barale, and David Halperin, eds., (New York: Routledge, 1993): 467-476.

<sup>15</sup> Dionne Brand, *In Another Place, Not Here*, (New York: Grove Press, 1996).

<sup>16</sup> Dionne Brand, “Nothing of Egypt,” in *Bread Out of Stone* (Toronto: Coach House Press, 1994): 138.